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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the notion of death as a philosophical and counter-hegeŵoŶiĐ suďjeĐt ͚eƌased͛ 
from the imperialist cartography of knowledge. It revo lǀes aƌouŶd thƌee ŵaiŶ poiŶts: the ͚loss͛ of 
death from the imperialist epistemology of the global North, its subservient position towards the 
dominance of life in biopolitical discourses, and the instrumentality of death under the ongoing 
matrix of colonial/capitalist power. The paper challenges the hegemonic rationality of biopolitical 
discourses while proposing counter-hegemonic alternatives: they are hereby mainly situated in the 
ĐƌitiƋue of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ eǆeŵplified ďǇ AĐhille Mďeŵďe͛s gƌouŶdďƌeakiŶg ǁoƌk on the politics of 
death. In what serves as an attempt to avert our gaze from the dominant viewpoint of epistemic 
iŵpeƌialisŵ, the papeƌ iŶǀites us to ͚uŶleaƌŶ͛ ǁhat ǁe aƌe supposed to ďe pƌoud of. As a ǁaǇ to 
engage in the decolonizing processes, it pleads for self-liberation from the forms of knowledge that, 
iŶ theiƌ Đlaiŵ to ďe ͚ uŶiǀeƌsal͛, ĐoŶtiŶue to peƌtaiŶ to the iŵpeƌialist ƌeasoŶ aŶd its hegeŵoŶiĐ ŵatƌiǆ 
of power. 
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Introduction 
The present paper examines the notion of death as a philosophical and counter-
hegeŵoŶiĐ suďjeĐt ͚eƌased͛ fƌoŵ the iŵpeƌialist ĐaƌtogƌaphǇ of kŶoǁledge. It also tƌaĐes the 
traumatic links between this and other subjects, most notably in what concerns the context 
of the colonial – ͞the blind spot upon which the modern conceptions of knowledge and law 
aƌe ďuilt͟ ;“aŶtos ϮϬϬϳ: ϱϬͿ. The fundamental loss of death in contemporary philosophical 
thought of the Western world makes the starting point of my analysis. It revolves around the 
hypothesis proposed by Swiss philosopher Bernard N. Schumacher who, in his recent study 
of death and mortality (Schumacher 2011) indirectly reveals the darker side of the current 
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episteŵologǇ ĐeŶteƌed eǆĐlusiǀelǇ oŶ ͚life͛ aŶd poiŶts out its ƌelatioŶs to the ďiopolitiĐal 
dogŵa ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚WesteƌŶ ŵaŶ͛, iŶ “ĐhuŵaĐheƌ͛s teƌŵs, ƌesides ǁithout ͚death͛.  
This is a problematic situation. Throughout its history, philosophy has treated ͚death͛ oŶ 
numerous and often polemical fronts as one of the central ideas constitutive for the 
discipline itself. However, the author notes a disturbing quietness – a ͞stoŶǇ sileŶĐe͟ 
(Schumacher 2011: ix) – that has nowadays prevailed around the philosophical reflections on 
death and dying. Due to this silence, the question of central importance for the first part of 
the paper at hand is as follows: where is ͚death͛ iŶ the iŵpeƌialist episteŵologies of the 
global North or the world-system that Schumacher Đalls ͚the West͛? “taƌtiŶg fƌoŵ this 
ƋuestioŶ, the papeƌ assuŵes that the ĐoŶteǆt iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚death͛ oĐĐupies a suďseƌǀieŶt ;͚lost͛Ϳ 
position in contemporary philosophical discourses is the context framed by the politics of life 
or biopolitics proper (Foucault 2003, Lemke 2011). As Thomas Lemke reminds us, ͞aĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to Foucault, biopolitics marks the threshold of modernity since it places life at the center of 
political order. In this theoretical perspective, there is an intimate link between the 
constitutioŶ of a Đapitalist soĐietǇ aŶd the ďiƌth of ďiopolitiĐs͟ ;Leŵke, ϮϬϬϱ: ϯͿ.2 This 
͚iŶtiŵaĐǇ͛ aŵoŶg ďiopolitiĐs, ŵodeƌŶitǇ aŶd Đapitalisŵ also deŶotes the folloǁiŶg: that the 
pƌiǀilege ďǇ ǁhiĐh ͚life͛ aŶd life-oriented discourses have gained their exclusive position over 
͚death͛ steŵs fƌoŵ the stƌategiĐ sepaƌatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚life͛ aŶd ͚death͛ iŶ the iŵpeƌialist 
cosmology. Such a cosmology grounds the biopolitical context as properly hegemonic and 
urges us to act by offering constructive counter-proposals. 
The second part of the paper challenges this situation. It questions the hegemonic 
rationality of biopolitical discourses while proposing counter-hegemonic alternatives. In this 
case, they are centered around the critique of sovereignty as proposed by Achille Mďeŵďe͛s 
groundbreaking work on the politics of death (Mbembe 2003). Accordingly, the second part 
                                                                 
2 In this context, it is ǁoƌth ŶotiŶg that the ĐoŶĐept of ďiopolitiĐs has Ŷeǀeƌ ďeeŶ FouĐault͛s ďƌaiŶĐhild: ǁhile 
the stubborn and repetitive application of the term to his name has determined our prevail ing understanding 
of biopolitics in relation to him, its origins l ie elseǁheƌe. As Leŵke aƌgues: ͞Although the concept of biopolitics 
has now become familiar, it may not be widely known that it has nearly a hundred -year history. Its initial 
appearance was as part of a general historical and theoretical constellation. By the sec ond half of the 19th 
century, Lebensphilosophie (the philosophy of l ife) had already emerged as an independent philosophical 
tendency; its founders were Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche in Germany and Henri Bergson in 
FƌaŶĐe. […] The ĐoŶĐept of biopolitics emerged in this intellectual setting at the beginning of the 20th century. 
The Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén may have been among the first to employ it.͟ “ee Leŵke ϮϬϭϭ: 9. 
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of the papeƌ pƌoďes the ͞eŵaŶĐipatoƌǇ/ƌegulatoƌǇ͟ diĐhotoŵǇ of the pƌojeĐt of ŵodeƌŶitǇ 
by pointing out the obscurity of sovereign colonial reason and the instrumentality of death 
therein. The objective is to show that death itself has been mobilized by sovereignty for the 
sake of its universalist and imperialist goals imposed upon the colonial territories, both old 
aŶd Ŷeǁ, thƌough the ͞appƌopƌiatioŶ/ǀioleŶĐe͟ dichotomy (Santos 2007: 46). Hence, it is the 
mortality of humankind – and not only their lives – that stands for the crucial element upon 
ǁhiĐh the ͚WesteƌŶ ŵaŶ͛ has eǆeƌĐised soǀeƌeigŶtǇ oǀeƌ the ƌest of the ǁoƌld iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
preserve the ideas of so-called modernity and progress, inseparable from three adjoining 
historical phenomena, namely: capitalism, coloniality, and globality (Mignolo 2011, 
Tlostanova and Mignolo 2009). 
These ďasiĐ theoƌetiĐal pƌeŵises aƌouŶd ͚death͛ ;iŶ teƌŵs of its ͚loss͛ fƌoŵ the imperialist 
epistemology, its instrumentality under the ongoing matrix of colonial/capitalist power, and 
its subservient position towards the dominance of life in biopolitical discourses) have 
provided the main grounds for the object of present analysis: the necro-coloniality of power, 
as I shall call it. It situates the idea of power in-ďetǁeeŶ ͚death͛ ;Mďeŵďe ϮϬϬϯͿ aŶd 
͚ĐoloŶialitǇ͛ ;TlostaŶoǀa aŶd MigŶolo ϮϬϬ9Ϳ3 where, for centuries, it has been mobilized by 
the imperialist epistemology as a privileged pƌeseƌǀe of ͚life-politiĐs͛ aŶd its ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ 
reason. Behind the biopolitical mask of such pretensions, the sovereignty has continuously 
iŶstƌuŵeŶtalized death. Death faďƌiĐated iŶ the Ŷaŵe of ͚ƌeasoŶ͛ peƌpetuated the ŵassiǀe 
production of victims for the sake of a colonial cause. 
I daƌe to saǇ that the ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ ƌeasoŶ of aŶ Iŵpeƌial BeiŶg ƌefleĐts its daƌkeƌ side iŶ the 
image of its own victims. Hence, the idea of modernity/coloniality/globality must be treated 
as a form of violence, both epistemic and ͚ƌeal͛, aŶd aŶalǇzed iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the ŵoƌtalitǇ of 
humankind inasmuch as to the death-worlds of knowledge. Both mirror the instrumentality 
of human deaths produced throughout the historical period of colonial occupation as much 
as in its current, global neo-colonial phase. The main thesis to be exposed here develops 
                                                                 
3 WheŶ usiŶg the teƌŵ ͚ĐoloŶialitǇ͛ I aŵ aǁaƌe of its difference from the terminology applied to the 
EuƌopeaŶ histoƌiĐal ĐoloŶialisŵ oǀeƌseas aŶd the ŶotioŶ of the ǁhite ͚ĐoloŶial͛ poǁeƌs oǀeƌ the ǁateƌs of the 
MediteƌƌaŶeaŶ, the AtlaŶtiĐ, the PaĐifiĐ aŶd so oŶ. Heƌe it iŵplies the logiĐ of the ͞ĐoloŶial ŵatƌiǆ of poǁeƌ͟. 
This is poiŶted out iŶ sĐholaƌlǇ ǁƌitiŶg oŶ ĐoloŶialitǇ as ͞the imperial/colonial  oƌgaŶizatioŶ of soĐieties͟, 
inclusive of historical period of colonialism yet extending up ti l l  today. (Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2009: 132).  
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aloŶg this liŶe of thought: it taƌgets the lethal poiŶts of episteŵiĐ ͚uŶiǀeƌsalisŵ͛ iŶ the 
ĐoŶĐeptual fƌaŵeǁoƌk of ͞ĐoloŶial ďliŶd spots͟ ;“aŶtos ϮϬϬϳͿ aŶd ͞ego-politics of 
kŶoǁledge͟ ;Gƌosfoguel and Mielants 2006), respectively. In the case of the former I refer to 
the strategic obscurity of death-politics inherent to the imperialist necro-colonial rationality 
aŶd its ͚aŵŶesia͛ aďout ĐoloŶial Đƌiŵes oǀeƌ huŵaŶkiŶd Đoŵŵitted iŶ the gloďal aŶti-
imperialist South; in the case of the latter I refer to the self-proclaimed universal knowledge 
of aŶ Iŵpeƌial BeiŶg that ĐoŶstitutes the esseŶĐe of todaǇ͛s gloďal episteŵiĐ soǀeƌeigŶtǇ aŶd 
its ƌatioŶalitǇ datiŶg ďaĐk to the  EuƌopeaŶ ͚EŶlighteŶŵeŶt͛. Both formulations are 
understood as inherent to the necro-coloniality of power, the violence against the anti-
colonial and anti-imperial subjects, and the tacit acceptance of crimes committed on behalf 
of the ͚ŵodeƌŶist͛, ͚ĐiǀiliziŶg͛, aŶd ͚eŵaŶĐipatoƌǇ͛ pƌoject of the global imperialist North. 
 
Iŵperialist Episteŵology aŶd the ͚Loss͛ of Death 
In his book Death and Mortality in Contemporary Philosophy Bernard N. Schumacher 
disĐusses death as a philosophiĐal issue that ͞ƌeŵaiŶs oŶe of the ŵost tƌouďliŶg ŵǇsteƌies 
foƌ philosophiĐal ƌefleĐtioŶ͟ ;“ĐhuŵaĐheƌ ϮϬϭϭ: ǆͿ. Fƌoŵ the ǀeƌǇ outset he ƌeŵiŶds us – and 
rightfully so – of the loŶg philosophiĐal tƌaditioŶ that has tƌeated ͞the aĐt of philosophiziŶg 
[…] as a pƌepaƌatioŶ foƌ death, as a ƌuŵiŶatioŶ oŶ life aŶd death͟ ;“ĐhuŵaĐheƌ ϮϬϭϭ: iǆͿ. He 
contends that we are currently experiencing the situation of fundamental loss when it comes 
to the state of reflections on death in the context of Western philosophical thought. He puts 
philosophy and its innate task – the task of being a discipline of knowledge – into the center 
of his arguments regarding the idea of loss – Ŷot the ͚loss of life͛ ďut the loss of death itself 
as a philosophiĐal suďjeĐt. Thus he pleads agaiŶst the ͚poǀeƌtǇ͛ of philosophǇ ǁith ƌegaƌd to 
its aversion towards speculations on death. For him, philosophy itself is threatened by the 
experience of a fundamental loss: the connection of philosophy – through death – to the 
essence of human existence deprives philosophy of its ontological grounds which constitute 
its nature of being philosophical. Hence, philosophy subverts its own nature when it refuses 
to haǀe itself eǆposed to ͞its theoretical and practical reflections on such fundamental 
theŵes͟ suĐh as death ;“ĐhuŵaĐheƌ ϮϬϭϭ: iǆͿ. Why would philosophy ever allow this to 
happen?  
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When reviewing the potential reasons for the emergence of such a calamitous situation, 
Schumacher exposes at least five possible answers: one is that we no more think about 
death; another is that this might be the result of our fear of death; also, it might be that the 
subject has lost its legitimate status (since some philosophers consider it not to be 
philosophical enough or not to be philosophical at all); additionally, its legitimate status has 
been revoked by considering death taboo; finally, we are averting our gaze from death as we 
are no more able or willing to devote any due attention to it – we are focused instead on 
soŵe less iŵpoƌtaŶt oƌ less fuŶdaŵeŶtal issues. ͞Whateǀeƌ the ƌeasoŶ͟, saǇs “ĐhuŵaĐheƌ, 
͞it seeŵs that philosophy would have everything to gain if it once again centered its 
theoretical and practical reflections on such fundamental themes, for they are at the heart of 
human existence͟ ;“ĐhuŵaĐheƌ ϮϬϭϭ: iǆ; ŵǇ eŵphasisͿ. 
He expands his arguments further, when it comes to the social context of so-called 
WesteƌŶ liďeƌal deŵoĐƌaĐies. Theƌe, ͞iŶ oƌdeƌ to safeguaƌd his happiŶess, ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
Western man has contrived to stop thinking at all about death and, more particularly, about 
his own death, to deny it in a way ďǇ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg a stoŶǇ sileŶĐe ǁith ƌegaƌd to it͟ 
(Schumacher 2011: ix). He adds to the discussion when he points out that the atmosphere of 
a ͚stoŶǇ sileŶĐe͛ ƌesults fƌoŵ the situatioŶ iŶ ǁhiĐh ouƌ atteŶtioŶ has wrongly been shifted to 
the direction that Đƌeates the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the ͚loss͛ of death. If keepiŶg oŶe͛s ǀoiĐe loǁ oƌ 
sileŶt aďout death ŵeaŶs to keep oŶe͛s happiŶess iŶtaĐt, this iŶtƌoduĐes a ǁhole Ŷeǁ seƌies 
of questions and doubts. In my view, instead of prohibiting our speech about death and 
dying, a different kind of discursive turn has to be introduced. It should redirect our 
atteŶtioŶ elseǁheƌe, toǁaƌd otheƌ possiďle ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶs of the ͚ŵǇsteƌǇ of death͛. I aƌgue 
that this redirection of attention is ŶeĐessaƌǇ as ŵuĐh as uƌgeŶt ďeĐause ͚death͛ has Ŷeǀeƌ 
been lost: it has been purposefully eradicated from our view. Where is death, then?  
I find this question important and challenging enough to open up the imperialist 
episteŵiĐ hoƌizoŶs ĐeŶteƌed pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ oŶ ͚life͛. The task, theƌefoƌe,  consists in finding 
the ǁaǇ out fƌoŵ the stƌategiĐ pƌeseƌǀe of ͚life aŶd happiŶess͛ iŶ the iŵpeƌialist 
epistemology of the global North at large. This is in order to turn our attention in the 
direction that might have been neglected so far: towards the space where the proper 
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philosophy of death resides or where such philosophy coexists among the many and varied 
local philosophies and knowledges spread across the global pluriverse of knowledge. 
For the Canadian philosopher Stuart J. Murray (2006) it is clear that the power of the 
soǀeƌeigŶ ;siŶgulaƌͿ uŶiǀeƌse of kŶoǁledge depeŶds upoŶ the iŵpositioŶ of ͚life͛ oǀeƌ 
͚death͛. BiopolitiĐs, iŶ his ǀieǁ, pƌesupposes a hegeŵoŶiĐ ĐoŶditioŶ ǁheƌe the supeƌioƌitǇ of 
life does not only appear against death but, more importantly, against the values inherent to 
the concepts of death, its theorizing and reflections across the many worlds of knowledge. 
That the pƌedoŵiŶaŶt ͚ǁoƌk of life͛ opeƌates agaiŶst the episteŵe ƌelated to the ͚ǁoƌk of 
death͛ ŵaǇ souŶd paƌadoǆiĐal foƌ our times of globally increased and expanded violence. 
Yet, centering on life and life-related issues presupposes an exclusion of implicitly or 
eǆpliĐitlǇ ͚saĐƌilegious͛ disĐouƌses ;iŶĐludiŶg those oŶ dǇiŶg aŶd deathͿ fƌoŵ the Ŷoƌŵatiǀe 
oƌ ͚saĐƌed͛ disĐouƌses on living. When he questions the fundamental lack of death from our 
disĐouƌses oŶ ;goodͿ life, he ƌightfullǇ highlights theiƌ ͚eǆĐlusioŶaƌǇ ƌight͛ to eǆist agaiŶst the 
backdrop of obscurity imposed on the question of death. Says Murray:  
Death informing life͛ ǁill  seeŵ ĐouŶteƌ-intuitive or even insane to us because, as Foucault has claimed, 
in the last two centuries we no longer properly speak of death. Discourses on death are as forgotten and 
disavowed as the nameless and innumerable deaths themselves. In the last two centuries, Foucault argues, 
political and sovereign discourses have focused instead on life. Life has eclipsed death. In the name of l ife, 
the ͚ŵass gƌaǀe͛ has ďeĐoŵe populaƌized, ŵakiŶg death;sͿ Ŷaŵeless aŶd iŶŶuŵeƌaďle, oďsĐuƌe aŶd 
obscured (Murray 2006: 192–193). 
The experience of exclusion thus produced makes an indispensable part of the negation 
ďǇ ǁhiĐh the soǀeƌeigŶ ƌeasoŶ ĐoŶdeŵŶs the ͚otheƌ͛ – a type of intellectual racism that 
eǆĐludes the suďjeĐt of death as the uŶdesiƌaďle ͚otheƌ͛ of life. It seeŵs as if death and 
disĐouƌses oŶ death haǀe ďeeŶ ͚saĐƌifiĐed͛ foƌ the sake of life aŶd disĐouƌses oŶ life as aŶ 
indispensable condition of contemporary biopolitical rationality and the undisturbed survival 
of its ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ ƌeasoŶ. “uĐh rationality negatively interferes with other possible types of 
rationality, forcefully dismissed from the life-centered imperialist epistemic universe. In that 
sense, the question of epistemic sovereign power is worth being recalled over and over 
again, in particular thƌough the figuƌe of ͚ego-ĐoŶƋuiƌus͛: 
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Occidentalism created the epistemic privilege and hegemonic identity politics of the West from which to 
judge aŶd pƌoduĐe kŶoǁledge aďout the ͚Otheƌs.͛ The egopolitiĐs  of knowledge of Rene Descartes in the 
17th century, where Western men replace God as the foundation of knowledge, is  the foundational basis of 
modern Western philosophy. However as Enrique Dussel (1994), Latin American philosopher of 
l iberation, ƌeŵiŶds us, DesĐaƌtes͛ ego-Đogito ;͞I thiŶk, theƌefoƌe I aŵ͟Ϳ ǁas pƌeĐeded ďǇ ϭϱϬ Ǉeaƌs  of the 
ego-conquirus (͞I ĐoŶƋueƌ, theƌefoƌe I  aŵ͟). The God-eye view defended by Descartes  transferred the 
attributes of the Christian God to Western men (the gender here is  not accidental). But this was only 
possible from an Imperial Being, that is, from the panoptic gaze of someone who is at the center of the 
world because he has conquered it (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006: 8). 
The panoptic gaze of an Imperial Being has cemented the dominant ideology of 
knowledge in a way that Enrique Dussel describes as deformed. For him, this has been 
heaǀilǇ depeŶdeŶt upoŶ the eǆplaŶatioŶ of EuƌopeaŶ ͚supeƌioƌitǇ͛ fƌoŵ a EuƌoĐeŶtƌiĐ poiŶt 
of ǀieǁ that ͞assuŵes ModeƌŶitǇ as eǆĐlusiǀelǇ EuƌopeaŶ […] aŶd oŶlǇ as a ƌesult of iŶteƌ-
EuƌopeaŶ pheŶoŵeŶa͟ ;Dussel, ϮϬϬϲ: ϰ9ϰͿ. He deteĐts theŵ iŶ the EŶlighteŶŵeŶt, the 
ideology of the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution. This indirectly suggests the  
reluctance of Europeans to deal profoundly with their own colonial responsibili ties behind 
the ŵask of ͚pƌogƌess͛ aligŶed ǁith theŵ. As he aƌgues, ͞iŶ oƌdeƌ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ModeƌŶitǇ, 
we need to discuss capitalism, colonization and Eurocentrism as processes that lend it their 
specific content [in demand for] a critical posture concerning the dominant explanation of 
ModeƌŶitǇ aŶd its assoĐiated pƌoĐesses͟ ;Dussel ϮϬϬϲ: ϰ9ϯͿ. This espeĐiallǇ ƌelates to the 
massive production of death during the era of the so-called colonial discoveries: 
To understand the history of the world from a different perspective [uncovers] an alternative history 
that emerges from the experience of the victims: the ideas of those who have been invaded and dominated 
aŶd ǁho haǀe Ŷot had the ĐhaŶĐe to eǆpƌess theŵselǀes. […] The EuƌoĐeŶtƌiĐ poiŶt of ǀieǁ ͚foƌgets͛ ǀeƌ y 
quickly that it was precisely the plundered resources of the colonies that have allowed the European 
splendor of the last 200 years (Dussel, 2006: 492–494; my emphasis).  
“iŵilaƌlǇ, ǁheŶ desĐƌiďiŶg the ŵǇths of EuƌopeaŶ ͚eŵaŶĐipatoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚deǀelopŵeŶtali st͛ 
colonial project, Aimé Césaire also spoke in relation to what he defines as colonial hypocrisy: 
The fact is that the so-called European civil ization – ͚ WesteƌŶ͛ Điǀil izatioŶ – as it has been shaped by two 
centuries of bourgeois rule, is incapable of solving the two major problems to which its existence has given 
rise: the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem; that Europe is unable to justify itself either 
ďefoƌe the ďaƌ of ͚ƌeasoŶ͛ oƌ ďefoƌe the ďaƌ of ͚ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛; aŶd that it takes refuge in a hypocrisy which is 
all  the more odious because it is less and less l ikely to deceive (Césaire 1972: 2). 
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A feǁ ƋuestioŶs ŵust ďe posed at this poiŶt of disĐussioŶ: fiƌst, hoǁ to thiŶk of ͚life͛ aŶd 
biopolitics in general (and of our own lives in particular) if we have not yet been able to cope 
with their deaths – the deaths of the ĐoloŶized ͚otheƌs͛, that is, of the huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs ǁho 
had to be sacrificed for the sake of our own living comfort in what is supposed to be a 
contemporary European democratic society today? How to think about the world politics 
and world-systems at large without acknowledging death, dispossession and accumulation 
of wealth – everything that the colonial (European and North American) hegemonic power 
machine has achieved throughout the last five centuries by means of the rational and 
sǇsteŵatiĐ ͞ŵaŶageŵeŶt of eǆtƌaĐtioŶ, eǆpulsioŶ, aŶd eǆĐlusioŶ͟ ;BaŶeƌjee ϮϬϭϭ, oŶliŶeͿ? 
How to think of biopolitics when its principle of life-management has become applicable not 
oŶlǇ to the ͞oƌgaŶizatioŶ of ŵodeƌŶ life ďased oŶ ĐoŵŵeƌĐe͟ ďut also to ͞the ĐoŶĐealŵeŶt 
and denial of the irrational use of violence that Eurocentric Modernity requires to enforce its 
doŵiŶatioŶ͟ ;Dussel, ϮϬϬϲ: ϰ9ϱ–496)? This discloses the need of contemporary humanity to 
ƌegaiŶ full aǁaƌeŶess of the fuŶdaŵeŶtal diĐhotoŵǇ ďetǁeeŶ the ͞pluƌalitǇ of  eǆpeƌieŶĐes 
iŶ the diǀeƌsitǇ of loĐal kŶoǁledges͟ ;Moosa ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϬϮͿ oŶ the oŶe haŶd, aŶd the siŶgulaƌ 
sovereign epistemic universe on the other hand. The latter (that particular local knowledge 
ƌeĐogŶized as ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛Ϳ has ďeeŶ foƌŵatiǀe foƌ the Đapitalist logiĐ thƌough ǁhiĐh the so-
called ego-conquirus still exercises sovereign power across the neo-colonial world.  
This is also the moment where necropolitics – as another name for biopolitics – must 
come to play. Without power linked to death (and the massive production of victimhood) no 
sovereignty could aspire toward the ultimate objective of the politics that it embodies, which 
is the necropolitics proper. I will focus on one exemplary module of counter-hegemonic 
thinking with regard to the sovereignty of death, as Achille Mbembe described it ten years 
ago. I see this as a necessary precondition to outline the limits of sovereignty on behalf of 
the ͚saĐƌosaŶĐt ǀalues͛ iŶǀested iŶ ͚life͛ ǀia the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ͚ďiopolitiĐal͛ disĐouƌses aŶd 
policies. To establish the forms of governance over humankind, primarily in terms of colonial 
subjects, here means nothing else but to have the human beings exposed to death through 
the sovereign right to kill. The limits of such governance outline the extent to which the 
tƌaǀestied hegeŵoŶiĐ ͚ďiopolitiĐal͛ thiŶkiŶg has Ŷot oŶlǇ ďeeŶ peƌtiŶeŶt to the eaƌlieƌ, 
historical period of colonization, but to the fact that it still operates upon the power of death 
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and death-politics – ďehiŶd the ŵask of ͚happiŶess͛, as “ĐhuŵaĐheƌ saǇs, that the ͚WesteƌŶ 
ŵaŶ͛ ǁaŶts to safeguaƌd at aŶǇ Đost. Had the pƌiĐe of that happiŶess ďeeŶ paid ďǇ the loŶg 
and painful unhappiness of a non-Western man, would that come as a big surprise and, if 
yes, for whom? 
 
Imperial Necropolitics and Anti-imperial Epistemic Resistance 
In 2003, the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe published an article that starts, in 
his oǁŶ ǁoƌds, fƌoŵ the assuŵptioŶ that ͞the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to 
a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die. 
Hence, to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental 
attributes. To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as 
the deploǇŵeŶt aŶd ŵaŶifestatioŶ of poǁeƌ͟ ;Mďeŵďe ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϭͿ. While drawing a critical 
distance from Michael Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, he ascribes this power to what he 
Đalls ŶeĐƌopolitiĐs, ͞the ĐoŶĐept of ďiopower, its relation to notions of sovereignty 
(imperiumͿ aŶd the state of eǆĐeptioŶ͟ ;Mďeŵďe ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϮͿ. What he ŵeaŶs ďǇ 
͚ŶeĐƌopolitiĐs͛ aŶd the ͚Ŷeǁ foƌŵatioŶs of poǁeƌ͛ peƌtaiŶs to populatioŶs͛ ŵoƌtalitǇ iŶ the 
hands of the imperialist matrix of power: the limits of sovereignty thus reside in its potency 
of exposing human life to death. Such a hypothesis implies the notion of imperium under 
conditions of the suspension of law, by which contemporary capitalism and its power-
mechanisms of control become diƌeĐtlǇ iŶ Đhaƌge of populatioŶs͛ death. This ĐoƌƌespoŶds 
ǁith the defiŶitioŶ of ŶeĐƌoĐapitalisŵ oƌ ͞the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ foƌŵs of oƌgaŶizatioŶal 
aĐĐuŵulatioŶ that iŶǀolǀe dispossessioŶ aŶd the suďjugatioŶ of life to the poǁeƌ of death͟ 
(Banerjee 2008: 1541). HeŶĐe, ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ the ͚Ŷeǁ foƌŵatioŶs of poǁeƌ͛ is the 
neoliberal matrix of necropower that has colonized not only the people, their natural 
resources and their territories, but also their right to live and their right to die 
unconstrained. If death is the objective of the political, conditioned by the neoliberal matrix 
of power as necropower, then the politics of death can be recognized as necropolitics 
proper. Necropolitics, as Mbembe concludes, is designated by ͞the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ǁaǇs iŶ 
which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes 
the ŵuƌdeƌ of the eŶeŵǇ its pƌiŵaƌǇ aŶd aďsolute oďjeĐtiǀe͟ ;Mďeŵďe ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϮͿ.  
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His work on the limits of sovereign power, its control over life and death, and its relation 
to human mortality was groundbreaking in that regard. According to him, both Western 
political science and the Foucauldian critical history of modernity have fallen short of the 
most significant task that the philosophy of power still has to perform nowadays. This task 
conceives of providing an account of sovereignty that is satisfactory for the existential and 
theoƌetiĐal positioŶ of the suďjeĐts ďehiŶd the ͚iƌoŶ ĐuƌtaiŶ͛ of ŶeoĐoloŶial doŵiŶatioŶ: the 
subjects of the global anti-imperialist South whose experience of life differs from the 
conditions in the global imperialist North. This implies the living conditions imposed by the 
global neoliberal regime and its ongoing colonial (or necro-colonial) matrix of power. Under 
such conditions, the life of the governed differs substantially from the lives of their masters. 
BǇ ŶaŵiŶg theŵ ͚ŵasteƌs͛ I ďƌoadlǇ iŵplǇ the suďjeĐts of the iŵpeƌialist Noƌth ǁho haǀe 
embraced, rather than opposed, the colonial conditions that, in a historical retrospective,  
turned to be beneficial for their own comfort of living nowadays. Our awareness about such 
different ways of living – and dying – under the necro-colonial matrix of power imposes an 
urgent need to approach the notion of colonial and capitalist sovereignty from a critically 
revised perspective, which Mbembe justly proposed.  
Hence, to speak in the name of death – instead of speaking in the name of life – exposes 
the need to speak differently from what the hegemonic context has already prescribed as a 
͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ Ŷoƌŵ foƌ its oǁŶ sake. To speak iŶ the Ŷaŵe of death ŵeaŶs to take oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
right to speak, to think and to act from a counter-position with regard to the hegemonic 
reason and according to the kind of rationality that does not necessarily comply with what is 
cuƌƌeŶtlǇ ĐoŶsideƌed as a Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ďiŶaƌǇ aloŶg the ͚life ǀeƌsus death͛ aǆis of thought. 
Finally, to speak in the name of death does not only mean to oppose the hegemonic reason 
centered on life and life-oriented discourses – it also means to propose another, counter-
hegemonic possibility of thinking, that overcomes the gap between two divided categories 
as esseŶtiallǇ asǇŵŵetƌiĐal. IŶ this ƌegaƌd, Dussel͛s ǁoƌds ĐaŶ ďe useful ǁheŶ he pleads 
agaiŶst ͞a histoƌiĐal pƌoĐess of asymmetric exchanges […] ďǇ so-called ͚WesteƌŶ ĐiǀilizatioŶ͛ 
[aŶd] the ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of ǁhat is usuallǇ Đalled ͚ModeƌŶitǇ͛, a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ that deŶotes the 
Đultuƌal ĐeŶtƌalitǇ of Euƌope […] siŶĐe the EuƌopeaŶ iŶǀasioŶ of the AŵeƌiŶdiaŶ Đultuƌes͟ 
(Dussel 2006: 492; my emphasis). Accordingly, the roots of the prevailing Eurocentric 
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siŵplifiĐatioŶ aŶd ƌatioŶalizatioŶ of ͞the ǁoƌld of life iŶ all its eĐoŶoŵiĐ, politiĐal, Đultuƌal 
aŶd ƌeligious suďsǇsteŵs͟ ;Dussel ϮϬϬϲ: ϰ9ϮͿ aƌe also the ƌoots of episteŵiĐ soǀeƌeigŶtǇ - 
͞the Đultuƌe of the EuƌopeaŶ ǀisioŶ of the ǁoƌld͟ - that we need to scrutinize and discuss 
again.  
Similarly, what Mbembe proposes is to work out our own ways towards another vision of 
the world, perceived from another viewpoint. Such a vision is but a significant example of 
todaǇ͛s counter-hegemonic theoretical strategies, produced locally yet with the causality 
and implications of global necrocolonial politics in mind. However, this vision is not 
conceived and shall not be accepted as another particular local knowledge, constructed in 
defense of a yet another pseudo-universal form of thinking that aspires to become the new 
epistemic sovereignty. We have to understand it as an alternative to the existent pseudo-
universalism of imperial thinking and, by doing so, to work towards establ ishing a possible 
counter-hegemonic theoretical coexistence among various knowledge-worlds in their 
pluƌalitǇ. Mďeŵďe͛s oǁŶ aƌguŵeŶts haǀe iŶsĐƌiďed his theoƌǇ of ŶeĐƌopolitiĐs iŶto 
contemporary philosophy as one possible and legitimate variant of global knowledges. That 
is the main reason why to understand necropolitics means to approach it as the other of 
ďiopolitiĐs: Ŷot as its ĐloŶe ďut as its iŶeǀitaďle half iŶ the ͚“iaŵese tǁiŶ͛ situatioŶ. IŶ this 
regard, I treat the theory of necropolitics as an intentionally pseudo-universal option 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌized ďǇ the stƌategiĐ pƌopeŶsitǇ to Đlaiŵ its oǁŶ ͚uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ͛ oŶ ďehalf of the 
global anti-imperialist South, and justly so: because its pseudo-universalism is aware of 
universalist mythology and its counter-effects: an obscurity imposed by the regime of 
singular universe of knowledge in the modern/colonial/capitalist/racial world-system 
(Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez, 2002). Necropolitical theory thus appears as a 
disguised decolonial option behind which the South enters into a profound dialogue with the 
obdurate Northern epistemic mytheme. Positioned side by side, they must keep this 
dialogue open. If the biopolitical armature (the dominant structure of knowledge-
communication) is gradually dismantled through such a dialogue, this will allow for a truly 
emancipatory potential of theoretical propositions, earlier dismissed, to be exposed again 
;oƌ, iŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases, foƌ the fiƌst tiŵe eǀeƌͿ. IŶ that seŶse, Mďeŵďe͛s ͚ƌetuƌŶ of death͛ to 
philosophy is part of the global and unavoidable process that is not only characterized by 
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one single anti-iŵpeƌial paƌadigŵ ;͚ŶeĐƌopolitiĐal͛, foƌ that ŵatteƌͿ ďut ƌatheƌ ďǇ Ŷuŵeƌous 
possible paradigms unrelated to necropolitics itself. Within such complexity, a single imperial 
epistemology is an insufficient option to cope with the numerous modalities of knowledge, 
or the pluriverse of local knowledge(s). Hence, to have the epistemological pluralism 
legitimized – and to have such legitimacy recognized and globally accepted side by side with 
the imperialist epistemology – is not only a worthwhile but an urgent task. It is so for the 
global anti-imperialist South as much as for the rest of the world. 
 
Conclusion 
IŶ the pƌeseŶt aƌtiĐle I haǀe uŶdeƌtakeŶ the task to ƌefleĐt, thƌough ͚death͛ as a 
philosophical subject, the possibilities of offering one counter-hegemonic option against the 
ŶoƌŵatiǀitǇ of ďiopolitiĐal ƌeasoŶiŶg as pƌesuŵaďlǇ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛. Its Ŷaŵe is ŶeĐƌopolitiĐal 
theory, here particularly understood as the theory of necro-coloniality of power. Instead of 
aĐĐeptiŶg the siŶgulaƌ aŶd pateƌŶalistiĐ ƌeleǀaŶĐe of ͚uŶiǀeƌsal ƌatioŶalitǇ͛ peƌtaiŶiŶg to the 
colonial and capitalist sovereignty and its ongoing epistemic matrix of power, the aim of this 
paper was to go deeper into questioning the philosophies of life and death under the ruling 
authority of neoliberal necrocapitalism as we are experiencing it nowadays. I have tried to 
develop some initial steps towards a discourse that examines the instrumentality of death 
behind the mask of biopolitics. In order to do so, I have put in the center of attention what I 
call the necro-coloniality of power: the neologism coined by theoretical adherences to the 
notions of necropolitics, necrocapitalism, and coloniality, respectively. It is a lso meant to 
expose a variety of theories from the other side of normative interpretations of life- and 
death-politics, most notably supported by theoretical patters given by Mbembe, Santos, 
Grosfoguel and Mignolo. While focusing on the notions of power, knowledge, and 
suďjeĐtiǀities ďehiŶd the ͚uŶiǀeƌsal ƌatioŶalitǇ͛ of a doŵiŶaŶt ǁoƌld-system, the paper asks 
ĐƌitiĐal ƋuestioŶs aƌouŶd the sǇsteŵ͛s ŶeĐƌopolitiĐal hegeŵoŶǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ouƌ kŶoǁledge -
worlds of life and death, and around the epistemic sovereignty of biopolitics against the 
counter-hegemonic discourses of death. Hence, the paper outlines the critical terrain from 
which to achieve two central goals: working out our own ways against any knowledge that 
claims to be universal, and opening up our own views toward the pluriversal horizons of 
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knowledge – those that belong to the worlds of knowledge spread across the global anti-
imperialist South and its counter-hegemonic epistemic cartographies. 
The message this paper aims at transmitting is, therefore, the following: if we are to 
uŶdeƌstaŶd the pƌeŵises upoŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe haǀe iŶheƌited ouƌ ĐoŶĐeptioŶs of the ͚ǁoƌld of life͛ 
and life-related subsystems, we must necessarily try and understand their conceptual and 
ideological backgrounds. They lie in the hegemonic rationality that has been pertinent to 
European modernity and the processes of massive and strategic death-production aligned 
with it. This brings us back to the beginning of the European colonial expansion overseas, to 
the Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ;͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛Ϳ ƌatioŶalitǇ eŶfoƌĐed ďǇ the ͚ĐiǀiliziŶg͛ pƌojeĐt of WesteƌŶ 
European Enlightenment, and to its long-term effects - including the so-called biopolitics. 
This dominant narrative, established by the rationalist ideology, is essentially mythological 
and reflects the ͞defoƌŵed ideologiĐal histoƌǇ that ǁe all studied at sĐhool͟ ;Dussel ϮϬϬϲ: 
494). This paper thus serves as an invitation to avert our gaze from the dominant viewpoint 
of episteŵiĐ iŵpeƌialisŵ aŶd to ͚uŶleaƌŶ͛ ǁhat ǁe, as ͚EuƌopeaŶs͛, aƌe supposed to be proud 
of. This is but one possible way to engage in the processes of self-liberation from imperialist 
thiŶkiŶg thƌough ǁhat is ŶoǁadaǇs Đalled the ͞seĐoŶd deĐoloŶizatioŶ͟. IŶ that ƌegaƌd, 
visionary enough, says Grosfoguel:  
The world needs a second decolonization more profound than the political -juridical decolonization 
experienced in the last 50 years. This second decolonization should address the global class, gender, racial, 
sexual, and regional asymmetries produced by the hierarchical structures of the modern/colonial capitalist 
ǁoƌld sǇsteŵ. DefiŶitelǇ, a gloďal pƌoďleŵ ĐaŶŶot haǀe a ͚ŶatioŶal͛ solutioŶ: it ƌeƋuiƌes gloďal solutioŶs 
[plural] (Grosfoguel and Cervantes -Rodriguez 2002: xxvii i).  
The main goals of the global self-liberating processes – to which this paper modestly 
contributes – consist in finding our own ways towards the horizons of epistemic 
decolonization. Such a liberation might be a long and never achievable goal; yet, it gives us 
the reason, universal enough, to keep aspiring towards the unrestrained forms of thinking, 
acting and living. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this struggle. 
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